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ABSTRACT
The paper concentrates how could the acceptance of radical naturalism
in Quine’s theory of meaning escorts Quine to ponder the naturalized
epistemology. W.V. Quine was fascinated about the evidential acquisition of
scientific knowledge, and language as a vehicle of knowledge takes a significant
role in his regimented naturalistic theory that is anchored in the scientific
framework. My point is that there is an interesting shift from epistemology to
language (semantic externalism).
The rejection of the mentalist approach on meaning vindicates external
that somehow pave the way for ‘semantic holism’, a thesis where the meaning
of a sentence is defined in turns to the totality of nodes and paths of its semantic
networks where the meaning of linguistic units depend upon the meaning of the
entire language. I would like to relook on Quine’s heart throbbing claim about
the co-extensiveness of the sentential relation and the evidential relation that
point towards an affirmation of meaning holism and semantic externalism.
Besides, the knowledge of acquaintance that relinquishes the singular thought
from the account of psychological consideration and self-knowledge hypothesis
copes up with the testimonial and warrant knowledge entangling by the claims
of social-knowledge as anticipated by Alvin Goldman. My conclusion would be
nearer to the stance of semantic externalism inculcated by the social knowledge
(in epistemic sense) and semantic holism.
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W. V. Quine, (I suppose) was the first philosopher who probably used
the term ‘naturalism’ from an empiricist ground holding that the standard paradigm
for all knowledge depends on scientific commitments. However, for Quine,
‘naturalism’ as a mine allege cannot be looked upon as a basis of the sciences.
In fact, it is a sort of an assertion about the premise that ‘science is all’ and
something that surpasses science turn out as bungling. Quine’s position on
science and philosophy seems comprehensively striking. He dislikes obliging
science upon philosophy, although he considers in his thesis that philosophical
methods ensue pertinence because of the paradigmatic base of natural science
and its consequences. We know that Quine in many ways intensely influenced
by the thoughts of empiricism and Vienna circle. Lockean empiricism trained
him that we want to deduce the truth of nature from the sensory evidences and
should describe the truth in terms of the logico-mathematical auxiliaries and
observation that can be confirming and also infirming it. Quine also inspired by
the Tarskian model of truth. Quine intends to see the problem from the ground
of ‘understanding a sentence’ relying on the epistemic conditions under which
the sentence turns true.
Epistemic Naturalism: Quine’s Outlook
Quine is mindful about the thesis that we are unable to alleviate all the
statements of the world into the same boundary of verificationism. He concerns
about the crumple of the radical empiricism, which emphasizes on the
instantaneous experiences which could validate our scientific assessments. Quine
believes in a reoriented process of ‘modern empiricism’ that perhaps argues
against the two tenets of empiricism. Quine writes,
Two cardinal tenets of empiricism reminded unassailable,
however, and so remain in this day. One is that whatever
evidence there is for science is sensory evidence. The other,
to which I shall return, is that all inculcation of meaning of
words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence.1
One may ask, ‘What is the fundamental panorama of natural science
that Quine hold?’ It looks extremely difficult to expose any precise response
from Quine’s thoughts. He introduced a few ideas about the natural science
and its upshots in philosophy. Some of the celebrating thoughts are as follows:
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First, Following Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‘language game’ (a kind of
‘evidential paradigm’), Quine introduces a pretty similar ‘evidential checkpoint
of science’ in philosophy. Quine urges, “A sentence’s claim to scientific status
rests on what it contributes to a theory whose checkpoints are in prediction.”2
Secondly, Quine takes care for an ‘inter-subjective’ checkpoint that
demonstrates an evidential base from the standpoint of the third person.
Thirdly, Quine believes in the holistic process of ‘web of belief’ in a
‘single language’ followed by the same logic. A critic may inquire, ‘what is the
necessity of this theory’? Gary Kemp, a prominent Quinean clarifies Quine’s
view from a different level. Kemp argues,
...all the evidence point to a single reality, not two or more, it
ought to be possible to have a single theory describing it, where
each part of it coheres with the rest on the score of explanation,
where this in turn is a matter, in the best cases, of subsuming
the explanda under maximally general quantified statements.3
Quine admits that the naturalism is not just a rigorous science and from
the impact on sensory surfaces, one can begin a theory of the external world
that may more or less close to the successful prediction. If you (an agent) wish
to analysis a theory, then the predictions stand for an evidential checkpoint. An
observation that links to an evidence of a theory has two notable features. One
is known as ‘inter-subjectivity’, whereas the other is called the ‘correspondence
to stimulation’. Observation sentences like ‘it is raining’ or “that’s a dog” are
relied on the occasional sentences. In this case, the occasion sensitivity deduces
the truth-value of the observation sentences. ‘Inter-subjectivity’ hypothesis
focuses on the evidences which have intertwined link with public sharability.
Besides, Quine believes that the observational sentences have some holophrastic
sense, i.e. the sentences could be formed out of any conjunction. I think that by
this way of holophrastic sense, we can simply tie among an observation and a
theory based sentence through predictions. For illuminating the significant
characteristics of the observation sentences, Quine himself writes,
The observation sentence is the means of verbalizing the
prediction that checks a theory. The requirement that it command
a verdict outright is what makes it a final checkpoint. The
requirement of inter-subjectivity is what makes science
objective.4
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Quine strictly believes that the observational sentences are considered,
as a vehicle of our scientific evidences as well as it seems an entering wedge of
language. The amendment of the naturalistic perspective engages language as
a social art in Quine’s writings. This is definitely a praiseworthy contribution of
Quine. Now the question is, ‘how could an observation sentence be relative to
the linguistic community?’ Quine urges that the observational sentences are
that on which the members of the community agreed outright on witnessing the
occasion. To sum up, the observational sentences are out exactly beyond of
any theory-laden premises. Even words in an observational sentence may recur
in other sentences anchored in some theoretical contexts. This connection seems
to me, is also a germane component of any externalist plea that I will certainly
discuss in the coming part of my paper.
The naturalistic conception of language can well ensemble with the
Quinean conception of naturalistic epistemology. However, it is amazing that he
abhors refusing the application of the conceptual analysis of common sense
that is also related to the experience or evidences, though these are slipshod,
piecemeal, and comparatively unsystematic ways of knowledge. Quine argues,
‘Science is not a substitutive for common sense but an extension of it.’5
Quine promises to propose a naturalistic explanation of knowledge that
outpaces the ‘knowledge of knowledge’ proposal. The account is not only
considered as mere justification of knowledge, but it actually bestows significance
on its explanation and consequences, whereas the conventional epistemology
attempts to find out the ‘certainty of knowledge’ in general. Epistemological
inquires have two dimensions. The first side is called the ‘conceptual side’
whereas the second side is called the ‘doctrinal side’6. The ‘conceptual side’ of
traditional epistemology defines the various concepts of the phenomenal
knowledge. Besides, the ‘doctrinal side’ copes with the justifications that confirm
those concepts that are revealed in the ‘conceptual side’ of epistemology. Quine’s
point shows that the ‘conceptual side’ is much closer to the theory of meaning,
whereas the ‘doctrinal side’ deals with the theory of truth and reference together.
In the beginning part of the paper ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, Quine clarifies
that epistemology is worried about the foundations of the sciences. Even he
feels uneasy to admit the Cartesian quest for certainty. He suggests that it is a
sort of ‘lost cause’.  However, Kim shows,
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In urging naturalized epistemology on us, Quine is not suggesting
that we give up the Cartesian foundationlist solution and explore
others within the same framework-perhaps to adopt some sort
of ‘coherenist’ strategy, or to require of our basic beliefs only
some degree of  ‘initial credibility’ rather than Cartesian
certainty...Quine’s proposal is more radical than that. He is
asking us to set aside the entire framework of justification-
centered epistemology. That is what is new in Quine’s proposals.
Quine is asking us to put in its place a purely descriptive causal-
nomological science of human cognition.7
Kim moreover advocates on Quine’s epistemology that predominantly
hints to the decisive issues like ‘how does evidence relate to the reality?’ Mainly,
the structure of knowledge according to Quine needs to be basis on the scientific
evidences. This kind of empiricist account tries to explicate the world from the
outlook of naturalism, but the fact is that our interpretation of the world is
expressed by the set of sentences and words. Here the role of language is to
mingle with the naturalized epistemology. It seems to me true that Quine was
interested in the eventual acquisition of scientific knowledge, yet language as a
vehicle of knowledge takes an imperative role in his regimented naturalistic
theory, but that sounds to me as a different interesting issue which can call for
an another paper. At this juncture, we locate a shift from talking of reference to
talking about words. Quine calls this shift as a ‘semantic ascent’ by believing
that a person who is responsive of the linguistic tricks can be a master of
referential language. Perhaps I assume that Quine is in no way denies the
dispositional use of reference fixations. Language of reference becomes suitable
when an agent says ‘my cat’ to refer to his/her own cat. Here the relation
between language and the world depends on the observational sentences and
the reference is just a capacity that is bonded with certain linguistic apparatus
(which is complex) that are also conjoined with observation sentences from an
externalist’s sense.
Knowledge and Externalism
Let me now crack down on the nature of ‘acquaintance’ as it is
doubtlessly the source of epistemic knowledge. The process of acquaintance
with an item allows an agent to believe the singular thoughts about it. A singular
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thought holds the hypothesis that no object no thought and different objects
different thoughts. Besides, the truth of that thought depends essentially on
what ways that very object is. So, for an example, the thought that ‘Chomsky is
a philosopher’ can be made true (or false) only by the existence and reference
fixation of the subject ‘Chomsky’. Note that the idea so far is not that the
acquaintance is such-and-such, and that allows you to think (relevant) singular
thoughts, but just that acquaintance is whatever it is that allows you to think
singular thoughts about an object. My attempt is not to show how acquaintance
turns out to be a constraint on singular thought, but here I might distinguish
sharply between the content of singular thought with their psychological
trepidation.  As you are aware, this is a delicate approach, and I do not have
any full theory that satisfies me on this score. Here I attempt to crack down on
this from the standpoint of psychological understanding of an acquaintance; an
approach to look at the ‘internal’ objects of acquaintance, especially if the objects
of acquaintance are supposed to be what underwrites the knowledge of the
external world. The Cartesian line of reasoning summarizes the idea of
indubitability or infallible knowledge of the individual’s thoughts, which are not
based on the empirical knowledge. Besides, self-knowledge hypothesis relies
on the observation of our inner side; we can also know that self-knowledge is
not empirically corrigible by others, so it becomes an incorrigible knowledge.
The statement ‘I have a ‘toothache’’’ is regarded as a ‘phenomenal avowals’
while the statement ‘I hope the weather continues cool’ is regarded as
‘attitudinal avowals’. Here three alternative characters interconnect with the
concept of avowals or self-knowledge8. These are authoritative, non-inferential,
and self-ascription where we found that it is possible for a third person to familiar
with all the pertinent facts of first person’s behaviours, but the third person
cannot be competent to grasp the basic psychology of the first person. Well, I
would not like to focus on the intricate claims, as I am more concerned about
the testimonial knowledge of a third person or social knowledge and would like
to see that whether the social knowledge preserves the demands of externalism
or not.
My consideration turns towards externalism from the essence of
semantic holism and Quinean idea of observational sentences. It looks true that
in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ Quine tries to decline the mentalist theory of
meaning by denying the traditional analytic-synthetic distinction. The first dogma
as Quine puts it is the cleavage between the analytic propositions that are
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grounded independently of matters of fact and the synthetic propositions that
are grounded only on facts or empirical contents. Critics consider that this
rejection of mentalist theory defends the thesis of externalism, which paves the
way to semantic holism. One thing is noteworthy to point out that the heart of
semantic holism rests on the meaning of a sentence that can be defined in
favour of the totality of nodes and paths in its semantic networks. Here the
important query is that how could ‘meaning holism’ be compatible with
externalism. Meaning holism seems allied with semantic externalism hypothesis.
It is an acceptable fact that we can have holistic externalist semantics. Let me
try to understand what I mean by holistic externalist semantics. It particularly
means two things-
First, the meanings are not in the head (externalism) and secondly, the
meanings of linguistic units rely on the meaning of the entire language (semantic
holism). Let us take a simple example of the determination of the meaning of a
predicate. Suppose we have a sentence that uses a natural kind term in its
predicate, viz. the sentence ‘Jimmy is a tiger’. In order to understand the sentence
we have to know the particular thing (may be subject or object) is denoted by
the name ‘Jimmy’ and which property or bundle of properties are denoted by
the predicate ‘is a tiger’. Further, we need to know if ‘Jimmy’ is indeed an
instance of those properties. How do we settle on which properties will be
denoted by the predicate. Here we must have to depend upon the socio-linguistic
practices of the community in which this sentence is uttered. We are looking at
the socio-linguistic practices of a community and so the meaning cannot be
located ‘in the head’ of the speakers. Besides, the meaning of a single predicate
depends upon the entire socio-linguistic practices (or we call it social knowledge
in Goldman sense) that are related to the entire language. This hypothesis
illustrates the ground of semantic holism. In this way, I would like to illustrate
how a holistic externalist semantic theory could work. Actually here the
contribution of the theoretical sentences is relied on the corporate bodies of the
other sentences. The progression doubtlessly looks for the ‘web-of-beliefs’
system.
Externalist plea evidently shows that the content of the beliefs depends
upon the external environment and obviously, it is not in the head of the speaker.
Now the point is that any kind of knowledge about the content of one’s belief
would be the knowledge of the external environment or society. It would be not
possible for the agents to know that ‘water is wet’ or ‘twater is wet’ without
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knowing the external world or environment where the terms ‘water’ and ‘twater’
are located. This sort of knowledge based on the empirical knowledge about
contents discards any kind of introspective knowledge that leads to the self-
knowledge or direct authoritativeness hypothesis. We know the Quine’s dictum
that ‘No entity without identity’9, therefore, the identification of an empirical
term could be promising in a knowledge system only if an agent is able to make
differentiation of a term with quite similar alternative terms . For an instance, in
this case one agent should be acquainted with the context and the criteria that
a glass of soda water in a bar and a glass of water in a hospital are not the
same. Even in the case of identifying the knowledge of X (a substance), one
must have to exclude the appropriate alternative of X. For Quine, the empirical
implication of a sentence is important to get its meaning as no sentence can
insist to generate meaning on its own. Meaning is nothing but a property of the
community of sentences that is indubitably man made procedures. This is a
holistic approach of meaning that structure of the thesis of empirical evidence
of meaning to rebuff the mentalist appeal and the corporate body of sentences.
Here the identification of thought relies on the objects and events, which are
causally and referentially related to the object of the thought. Following Putnam’s
Twin Earth Thought experiment, one can aptly claim that the truth-value of a
term like ‘water’ or any referent object rests on the world in which speaker
utters the sentence.
For  me the externalist turn towards semantic holism escorts to the
social nature of knowledge, where the knowledge of the subjects does not only
depend on the identification of the empirical terms, but on the causal reliable
and testimonial knowledge of the others or society. The contention here is nothing
but the social practices regarding language uses, where the agents get the
meaning of the concepts or terms from the experts or the other members of the
society. Hilary Putnam as a prominent externalist introduces the idea of ‘division
of linguistic labor’, i.e. the experts who have specialised background knowledge
in a specified field. We are common people have an epistemic reliance on the
experts and non-experts too. It may be well possible that a person whom we
considered as an expert has partial knowledge (i.e. no comprehensive grasp of
the concept in respects to composing the content) about the specific object (like
Diamond). Putnam does not consider that the experts have the comprehensive
grasp of the meaning of the refereed terms, yet he accepts that they know or
understand better than the ordinary people understand especially about its
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chemical formulas like its allotrope of carbon composition or its atomic number
like 79. Though both the experts and the common people refer to the same
metal as they have same stereotype, but the experts have a better description
of the extension of the terms from a scientific stand. But the naturalistic outlook
of semantic externalism depends on its shared paradigm hypothesis that gives
prominence of the public sharability of meaning and content of our beliefs. I
write elsewhere,
I think that the most attractive part of semantic externalism, as
argued by Putnam, is its naturalistic outlook towards human
beings in the world.10
If we would like to see Alvin Goldman’s position (that highly impressed
me), then we will notice that he also admires the position of communication and
social knowledge as a hallmark of human culture by shielding on externalism.
Through communication, we can exchange the effective knowledge and it seems
true that not every person of the society can personally discover the sincere
veridical report or the certain knowledge about a particular thing, so testimony
takes a pertinent role in the case of successful communication. The process of
social knowledge distribution relies on the fourfold criterion like – discovery,
transmission of message, message reception and message acceptance. One
can easily argue against trustworthy of testimonial knowledge because of the
wrong interpretation or misleading information of the testimonial person. A group
of philosophers tries to answer this question from different levels. We know
some of them like Burge’s epistemic default position, Richard Foley’s thought
of ‘Epistemic Non-egoism’ that puts forward the idea of whether one should
allow the elemental epistemic authority to others by rejecting the inductive
evidence of other people’s reliability. Harman’s approach that is called ‘negative
coherentism’ talks about the innocent epistemic beliefs, until it goes wrong or
unjustified by the reason of doubting. Goldman defends the position of ‘reliablism’
and urges:
In its simplest form, justificational reliabilism says that a belief
is justified if and only if it is produced (and/or sustained) by a
reliable belief-forming process or sequence of processes. For
testimonial belief to be justified it suffers that the general process
of accepting the reports of others mostly yield truths. Accepting
the reports of others is really a specific patter of inference,
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where inference is constructed as a process that takes some
beliefs as inputs and generates new beliefs as outputs.11
Goldman believes in ‘reliabilism’ in the sense that it produces some
reliable beliefs depending upon the prevalence senses (concern about what is
going on in the actual world) and propensity senses (concern about what is
going on in the actual and possible world) that invoke to discard any type of
wishful thinking and confused reasoning. Here we attain justified true believe
on the basis of truth ratio (reliability). This reliabilist turn may be compared
with his social epistemology, where he quests for epistemic paternalism that
talk about the reasonable amount of control provided by relevance evidences
as necessary conditions of the testimonial knowledge. The truth indicator of
reliabilism in no way linked with cognitive accessibility. These are yield to the
second order evidence relying on evidence and justification. In his earlier
writing12, we know that he stimulated by the causal theory and tried to find out
the evidential based causal connection between beliefs and facts.  I like to
accept that there are ample numbers of concept and thought that are
indescribable but exist in the head of the speaker without associated with
words. For me, all thoughts have a relation to the world in the following sense:
there is a potential condition in which these have an effect (may be causal or
conceptual linkage) to the world. Here the stance of social knowledge depends
on the ‘warranted epistemic reliability’ and testimonial sources intervening with
externalism instigates beliefs and meanings as world oriented or socially
constructed. Externalist who believes in the social knowledge configures our
beliefs from the perspective of the believers or says beliefs are sited where the
believers are i.e. the society or world. I think here the concern is not about
beliefs itself, but about the content of beliefs where the social and the linguistic
practices are embedded with our knowledge of the content of beliefs. Actually,
all thoughts are caused by the world, as these are the states of the brain embedded
by the causal histories that involve many factors including the world, evolutionary
forces, etc. There are some thoughts that are not conjoined to the matter of the
facts and have idiosyncratic efforts on agent’s behaviour. This is possible because
the kind of situation in which they would affect behaviour will not as it happens
to arise. The striking point preserves here the mental images as well have some
causal powers of the contents that help all these to relate to the world and
objects.
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